Due Process in AIA Proceedings after \u3ci\u3eSAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu\u3c/i\u3e by Stone, Mikaela & Davis, Britton
Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
Volume 18 
Issue 2 PTAB Bar Association Article 3 
2-8-2019 
Due Process in AIA Proceedings after SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu 
Mikaela Stone 
Britton Davis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mikaela Stone & Britton Davis, Due Process in AIA Proceedings after SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 18 Chi. 
-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 23 (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol18/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of 





DUE PROCESS IN AIA PROCEEDINGS 
AFTER SAS INSTITUTE INC. V. IANCU 
MIKAELA STONE & BRITTON DAVIS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the Supreme Court’s recent abolishment of partial 
institution decisions in inter partes reviews of patents, in SAS Institute Inc. 
v. Iancu (“SAS II”),1 the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) runs a 
greater risk than it previously did of due process violations in its final 
written decisions. Because all claims will be instituted if a reasonable 
likelihood of success is found for even one claim, the PTAB may have less 
incentive to provide the same depth of analysis previously provided in the 
institution decision for all claims and all grounds. Less analysis early-on by 
the PTAB means the parties have less notice of the PTAB’s positions and, 
thus, less of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, increasing the risk that 
any change of position by the PTAB at a final written decision will result in 
a due process violation against petitioners and patent owners. Because of 
this, SAS II may have the practical impact of placing an additional onus on 
patent owners to set forth in their preliminary response any arguments that 
might, if institution is granted, serve as a basis for the PTAB finding claims 
not unpatentable, to decrease the likelihood that such a final written 
decision will be found to violate petitioners’ due process rights. 
This article begins by discussing the boundaries that due process and 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) impose on the actions of 
administrative adjudicatory bodies like the PTAB. The article then analyzes 
how the Supreme Court’s SAS II decision disincentivizes fulsome analysis 
by the PTAB in its institution decisions, the additional burden faced by 
patent owners electing to file a preliminary response, and the attendant 
 
 1. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
  
24 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. | PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION Vol 18:2 
 
increased risk of due process violations by the PTAB. Finally, this article 
concludes with recommendations for practitioners and a discussion of what 
is necessary to preserve a party’s right to appeal a due process violation. 
II. DUE PROCESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AT THE 
PTAB 
A. The Administrative Procedure Act Protects Both Patent Owners 
and Petitioners 
America Invents Act (“AIA”) proceedings are subject to due process 
limits and the APA,2 which provides, inter alia, that “[p]ersons entitled to 
notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of . . . the matters of 
fact and law asserted.”3  This protection has always been understood to 
apply to patent owners because they are in danger of losing their 
intellectual property.4 In addition, the Federal Circuit has identified two 
reasons to support the application of the APA’s protections to petitioners as 
well. First, the Court has cited the APA’s coverage of “[p]ersons entitled to 
notice of an agency hearing,” explaining that “[i]n an IPR proceeding, this 
class of persons includes the petitioner.”5 Second, the Court explained: 
 
[A]ffording petitioners with the benefit of § 554(b)(3) is appropriate 
because petitioners are not disinterested parties in an IPR 
proceeding. Rather, petitioners stand to lose significant rights in an 
instituted IPR proceeding because of the estoppel effects that trigger 
against them if the Board issues a final written decision.6 
 
The rationale behind the inter partes review estoppel provision, 35 
U.S.C. § 315(e), was to prevent successive challenges to a patent by those 
 
 2. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1316 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We review Board decisions using the standard set forth in the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 et seq.”); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2142 (2016) (“‘[S]henanigans’ may be properly reviewable in the context of § 319 and under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which enables reviewing courts to ‘set aside agency action’ that is 
‘contrary to constitutional right,’ ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction,’ or ‘arbitrary [and] capricious.’”); 
SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 3. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (2012). 
 4. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1369 (2018) 
(“The decisions should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of 
the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”). 
 5. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC (SAS I), 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d 
on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3)). 
 6. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012)). 
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who previously have had the opportunity to challenge the patent before the 
PTAB.7 However, the application of this estoppel provision presumes that a 
party has previously had the opportunity to challenge the patent. To ensure 
that estoppel is not wrongfully applied to petitioners who did not have that 
opportunity, it is necessary to afford a petitioner the protections of the 
APA, as well as the right to appeal alleged violations.8 
B. The PTAB’s Boundaries Under Due Process and the Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Under the APA, the Federal Circuit is required to “hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action . . . not in accordance with law [or] . . . without 
observance of procedure required by law.”9 “The indispensable ingredients 
of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a disinterested 
decision-maker.”10 As such, the APA requires the PTAB to timely inform a 
party of the “matters of fact and law asserted” and provide an opportunity 
to submit facts and argument.11 
The Federal Circuit has explained that to ensure that both parties are 
properly afforded notice and the opportunity to be heard, an agency may 
not “change theories in midstream without giving respondents reasonable 
notice of the change and the opportunity to present argument under the new 
theory.”12 In applying this test to PTAB proceedings, the Federal Circuit 
has focused its analysis on whether the new theory served as the basis for 
 
 7. See Aruze Gaming Macau, Ltd. v. MGT Gaming, Inc., No. IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 14 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 20, 2015); see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
 8. It is worth noting that Courts have called into question whether the estoppel faced by non-
practicing petitioners is enough to support standing for an appeal to an Article III court. See Consumer 
Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Phigenix, Inc v. 
Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that the estoppel provision for 
IPRs does not constitute an injury in fact when the appellant is not engaged in activity “that would give 
rise to a possible infringement suit”); Altaire Pharm., Inc. v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc., 889 F.3d 1274, 
1282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2018). When the touchstone of preclusion is whether a party already had the 
opportunity to be heard, it seems significant that, under particular circumstances, a petitioner may not 
only be denied the opportunity to be heard by the PTAB, but may then also be found to lack standing to 
be heard at the Federal Circuit regarding the PTAB’s potential due process violation. In such a case, 
estoppel would be wrongfully applied to a petitioner at the district court, and the agency would 
effectively have freedom to make intellectual property validity determinations without oversight. 
 9. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016); 
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018). 
 10. Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 
Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 11. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3); see also Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharm. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
 12. Belden, 805 F.3d at 1080; Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1324 (internal citation omitted).  
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the decision and whether the party was denied a meaningful opportunity to 
respond to the new theory.13  
For example, where the parties have argued a determinative issue in 
their briefing (either of their own accord or because the issue was 
introduced in the institution decision), the Federal Circuit has found that 
the parties were given meaningful opportunity to be heard.
14
 But where the 
basis for the PTAB’s final decision has been introduced at oral arguments, 
or as a new argument in the reply with no opportunity for sur-reply, the 
Federal Circuit has found a due process and APA violation. 15  These 
conclusions are in line with the traditional analysis of due process.16 It is 
worth noting is that the “new theory” must serve as the basis for the final 
written decision—where new factual grounds regarding a reference already 
at issue have merely been used as motivation to combine or to describe the 
state of the art, the Federal Circuit has found no violation.17  
In its previous decisions, the Federal Circuit has placed special 
significance on whether the PTAB has been inconsistent between its 
findings in the institution decision and the final written decision—
 
 13. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that a 
party was denied its procedural rights when the PTAB based its decision on a factual assertion 
introduced at oral argument, after the party “could meaningfully respond”); Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1325–
26 (finding no due process violation when the PTAB rejected a reference as anticipatory in the 
institution decision, but relied on the reference in a final written decision for motivation to combine two 
other references because the PTAB had not been inconsistent and the parties had been heard regarding 
the very same issue); Securus Techs., Inc. v. Global Tel*Link Corp., 685 F. App’x 979, 985–86 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (finding no due process violation when the Board based its decision on an argument in 
petitioner’s reply brief, which clarified an argument found in the petition, and when the patent owner 
did not exhaust his procedural options to be heard on the issue); Belden, 805 F.3d at 1080–82 (finding 
no due process violation when party did not use the regulatory safeguards of due process to request an 
opportunity to be heard); In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d 966, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding due process 
violation when a party was denied its request to respond to an argument raised in the reply brief and 
was therefore denied the opportunity to be heard on a new issue); Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. 
P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding no APA violation 
when references cited in the final written decision merely served to describe the state of the art and did 
not serve as invalidating references). 
14.    E.g., BASF Corp. v. Iancu, No. 2017-1425, 2018 WL 3456307, at *6 (Fed. Cir. July 17, 2018) 
(finding no due process violation where the basis for the final written decision was introduced in the 
petition, acknowledged in the institution decision, and discussed at oral argument); Anacor Pharms., 
Inc. v. Iancu, No. 2017-1947, 2018 WL 2187768, at *4–6 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2018). 
 15. Dell Inc., 818 F.3d at 1301–02; In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d at 970. But see Securus Techs., Inc., 
685 F. App’x at 985–86 (finding that because the parties had been given an opportunity to be heard 
regarding the PTAB’s new interpretation of the prior art, the APA’s requirements were satisfied). 
 16. Nicholas J. Doyle, Confirmation Bias and the Due Process of Inter Partes Review, 57 THE J. 
OF THE FRANKLIN PIERCE CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. 29, 41–43 (2017) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 346 (1976)). 
 17. Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1325–26; Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 825 F.3d at 1366–
67. 
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circumstances which would indicate a “change [in] theories in 
midstream.” 18  When such an inconsistency occurs, the parties must be 
given the opportunity to respond to the change; otherwise, the PTAB 
commits a possible due process violation. These opinions demonstrate that 
for any question of due process, the analysis will focus on where and when 
the case-dispositive issue was first raised and whether that provided the 
responding party with sufficient notice and an opportunity to meaningfully 
respond in either its briefing or oral arguments. 
C. SAS Effects & The Increased Risk for Due Process Violations 
It is in each party’s self-interest to ensure that its briefs sufficiently 
develop the arguments supporting its position to provide the basis for a 
final written decision that will not be overturned due to an APA violation.19 
As always, petitioners must be certain to raise all arguments and claim 
construction positions in the petition or they must be ready to forfeit the 
right to rely on “new arguments” later in the reply.20 But now, as explained 
below, the decision in SAS II has erected an increased hurdle for patent 
owners to avoid institution. Because of the reduced incentive for the PTAB 
to provide complete analysis in its institution decisions on all claims and on 
all grounds, it is more important than ever that patent owners forgo the 
temptation to skip a preliminary response, to help ensure that their 
counterarguments and claim construction positions are fully developed and 
available to provide a permissible basis for patentability determinations at 
final written decision. 
D. Brief Summary of SAS and What It Means for PTAB Practice 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in SAS II rejected the propriety 
of the “partial institution” practice previously followed by the PTAB to 
sometimes institute on only some of the challenged claims.21While the 
decision whether to institute review remains discretionary following SAS II, 
the Court emphasized the fact that it is the petition, not the Board, that 
defines the scope of the review if it is instituted.22 Based on this holding, 
 
 18. Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1324–26; Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 825 F.3d at 1366–
67. 
 19. See supra Part II.B. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012); Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 
1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 21. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358–59 (2018). 
 22. Id. at 1355. 
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the PTAB’s guidance following the release of the SAS II decision, and 
recent Federal Circuit guidance, all claims and grounds will now rise or fall 
as one at the institution stage.23 
The relevant statutory language affords the PTAB discretion as to how 
much information it includes in its institution decision.24 The PTAB has 
confirmed this reading of the statute, concluding that analysis of only one 
representative claim in an institution decision does not constitute an abuse 
of discretion.
25
 But the Federal Circuit has implied that guidance by the 
PTAB in its institution decision is necessary to avoid a due process 
violation. 26  On appeal from a final written decision in EmeraChem 
Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
found that the PTAB’s statements in its institution decision did not make 
clear that it was relying on a particular prior art reference to invalidate the 
dependent claims, as well as the independent claims discussed in its 
decision to institute.27 When the PTAB relied on the reference in its final 
written decision as a primary invalidating piece of prior art, the Federal 
Circuit found that the parties were never “on notice” and the PTAB had 
violated the patent owner’s due process right to be heard.28 Thus, the PTAB 
has the power to shape and direct the parties as to what case-determinative 
issues should be included in the briefing by providing a fulsome analysis in 
its institution decision, but it is not required to do so.   
E. Potential Due Process and Administrative Procedure Act Concerns 
As always, it remains important that petitioners continue to ensure that 
all potential arguments are raised in the petition and to provide their 
relevant claim construction positions under 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(b)(3). 
 
 23. Id. at 1354; PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2018); David 
Ruschke, et al., Chat with the Chief on SAS, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 5–6 (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/chat_with_chief_sas_5.3.18.pdf. 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a); PGS Geophysical, 891 F.3d at 1359–60; David Ruschke, et al., Chat with 
the Chief on SAS, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 30, 2018) (unpublished conference call). 
25.   Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, No. IPR2018-00070, Paper 27 (P.T.A.B. 
Aug. 31, 2018). 
 26. EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 859 F.3d 1341, 1348–50 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017); see also Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., concurring) (noting that “regardless of whether the Board’s institution decisions 
can be appealed, the Board cannot create a black box decisionmaking process”). 
 27. EmeraChem Holdings, LLC, 859 F.3d at 1348–50. 
 28. Id. at 1350–51. 
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Should a petitioner fail to do so, it would lose the ability to make the 
argument because the petition defines the scope of the review.29 
The SAS II decision has increased the hurdle faced by patent owners in 
opposing the institution of a PTAB proceeding and, at the same time, in at 
least some senses disincentivizes patent owners from raising 
counterarguments early on, in a preliminary response. This is because the 
patent owner, under SAS II, will have to address and win on every claim 
and every ground to avoid institution. 30  However, the need to develop 
arguments early on in the proceedings remains even after SAS II, because, 
as discussed above, only arguments upon which the parties have been heard 
may serve as the PTAB’s basis for protecting the validity of a patent. 
A particular example of this can be seen concerning claim 
construction. While the analysis provided in an institution decision is 
preliminary, the Federal Circuit has made it clear that the PTAB may not 
inconsistently construe terms between its institution decision and final 
written decision without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard, 
because doing so would be an impermissible change of theories in 
midstream. 31  Where a patent owner chooses not to file a preliminary 
response, it may inadvertently delay the parties’ arrival at a focused claim 
construction dispute, increase the risk that an argument is raised without 
meaningful notice, and lose the ability to rely on an alternative construction 
without a due process violation. 
SAS II has also removed any general requirement for the PTAB to 
analyze the relative strengths of the various challenges raised in a petition 
in the institution decision because all claims and grounds will rise or fall as 
one.32 Following SAS II, the PTAB need only address one claim in its 
institution decision, since a showing of reasonable likelihood of success as 
 
 29. Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018). 
 30. See supra Part II.D.; 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (2016). 
 31. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d on 
other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (“What concerns us is not that the Board adopted a construction 
in its final written decision, as the Board is free to do, but that the Board ‘change[d] theories in 
midstream.’”) (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015); 
Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Ericsson Inc., 686 F. App’x 900, 905–06 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that 
when the PTAB adopted a construction raised by neither party and first raised at oral argument, there 
was no due process violation because the parties vigorously debated the issue at the hearing and neither 
sought rehearing or a sur-reply). But when a party puts the construction at issue by disputing an initial 
construction, the party is on notice that the PTAB could alter it. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical 
Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1328–30 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 32. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1354; Ruschke et al., supra note 23. 
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to even one claim will allow institution of the entire petition.33 Since the 
SAS II decision issued, the majority of panels appear to be largely 
continuing their practice of providing analysis of all claims and grounds in 
their institution decisions, helping guide the focus of the parties’ briefing.34 
But such analysis is not guaranteed. For example, in Alcatel-Lucent USA 
Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, the Board instituted inter partes review and 
provided analysis of only one representative claim in its institution 
decision.
35
 On request for rehearing, the Board quoted the Supreme Court’s 
decision in SAS II, stating that “Section 314(a) does not require the Director 
to evaluate every claim individually. Instead, it simply requires him to 
decide whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on at least 1 claim.”
36
 
Where the PTAB declines to provide guidance on all claims and all 
grounds in its institution decisions, it may limit the permissible basis for 
both patentability and unpatentability determinations in its final written 
decision under the APA, should the PTAB recognize an issue or evidence 
not directly addressed by the parties. The institution decision can help give 
notice of, frame, and focus the parties’ subsequent briefing on case-
dispositive issues. For example, in Alcatel-Lucent, while explaining that 
analysis of one claim was sufficient, the Board, in actuality, provided 
additional guidance by discussing weaknesses in the preliminary response 
and identifying a critical claim construction issue.
37
 Without the rehearing 
order, the parties would never have received this initial evaluation. During 
its preliminary analysis, the PTAB may develop an initial impression as to 
particular weaknesses in the prior art or an appropriate claim 
construction.38 Should the parties fail to recognize the significance of a 
case-dispositive issue, they may choose to focus the briefing elsewhere. If 
the PTAB were to rule on the basis of such an issue, and it was not 
included in the institution decision, the parties may not have been given a 
full opportunity to be heard on the issue and one or both parties might have 
grounds for an appeal under the APA.39 
 
 33. See SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1359. 
 34. Id.; See Ruschke et al., supra note 23 (encouraging panels to continue providing analysis of all 
claims challenged). 
35.  Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, No. IPR2018-00070, Paper 27 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 
31, 2018). 
36.   Id. at 4. 
37.   Id. at 5. 
 38. See generally Doyle, supra note 15. 
 39. Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015); SAS Inst., Inc. v. 
ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, (quoting Belden, 
805 F.3d at 1080). 
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III. PRACTICE POINTERS 
The increased risk of due process violations resulting from SAS II 
increases the importance that the parties ensure their right to be heard is 
both satisfied and preserved. Moving forward, it continues to be important 
that a petitioner raise all arguments in the petition or forfeit the right to rely 
on the argument later in the proceeding. Despite the decision in SAS II and 
the resulting hurdle at the institution phase, it is also now more important 
that patent owners use their preliminary response to raise counterarguments 
and claim construction positions, placing the petitioner on notice of the 
same, and preserving the PTAB’s ability to rely on such positions as a basis 
for finding patentability without violating a petitioner’s due process rights. 
Patent owners should pay special attention to claim construction 
opportunities for all challenged claims at the institution stage. Given the 
Federal Circuit’s determination that the Board may not come to 
inconsistent claim construction determinations between the institution 
decision and the final written decision without the parties having an 
opportunity to be heard,40 winning a preliminary claim construction at the 
institution stage could be significant. 
Both parties must be vigilant for due process violations, and either use 
the procedural safeguards of the PTAB proceedings to address them or face 
waiver or forfeiture. To appeal a decision under the APA, a party must be 
able to show that it was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard on a 
case-dispositive issue.41 That is, the party must preserve its right to appeal 
by using the procedures available to it, including requesting leave to file a 
motion for observation of evidence, leave to file a sur-reply to address new 
evidence and argument, or a rehearing of a final written decision based on a 
new factual basis.42 The Federal Circuit has made it clear that if parties do 
not avail themselves of the procedural safeguards built into the PTAB 
proceedings to request an opportunity to be heard, then they are not 
necessarily denied the right to be heard and no due process violation may 
have occurred.43 To ensure that an appeal of a due process violation is not 
 
 40. SAS I, 825 F.3d at 1351.  
 41. Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re NuVasive, 841 
F.3d 966, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 42. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.51(b)(2)(i), 42.20(b), 42.71(d) (2015); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 
Fed. Reg. 48756, 48767–68 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 43. Belden, 805 F.3d at 1082 (“With no Board denial of concrete, focused requests before us, we 
are not prepared to find that Belden was denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to the grounds of 
rejection . . .”); In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d at 970 (finding a due process violation where a party’s request 
to respond to an argument raised in the reply brief was denied); Securus Techs., Inc. v. Global Tel*Link 
 
  
32 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. | PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION Vol 18:2 
 
waived or forfeited, it is imperative that the parties are aware of their 
procedural rights and seek to timely vindicate them in the PTAB after a 
violation has occurred. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With the possibility of less analysis occurring at the institution stage, 
the risk for due process violations has only increased post-SAS II. Both the 
PTAB and the parties must make an effort to be forthcoming with their 
prior art positions, evidence, and claim construction positions, and parties 
must take advantage of procedural protections to preserve their right to 
appeal a due process violation. 
 
Corp., 685 F. App’x 979, 985–86 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding no due process violation where patent owner 
did not exhaust its procedural options to be heard on the issue). 
